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A Forgotten Minority: The Return of the 
Auslandsdeutsche to Germany in 1919-20 
MATTHEW STIBBE 
Sheffield Hallam University 
This article examines the expulsion of Germans abroad (Auslandsdeutsche) from 
Allied countries and colonial empires in the aftermath of the First World War, and 
their somewhat negative reception in Weimar Germany in 1919-20. It does so 
against the background of what it identifies as a re-territorialisation of German 
national identity, beginning during the war itself and leading to an abrupt reversal 
of previous trends towards the inclusion of Germans abroad within broader 
transnational notions of Germanness (Deutschtum), rights to citizenship and 
aspirations to world power status. Re-territorialisation was not born out of the 
logic of de-territorialisation and Weltpolitik in any dialectical sense, however. 
Rather, its causes were largely circumstantial: the outbreak of global war in 1914, 
the worldwide economic and naval blockade of Imperial Germany, and its final 
defeat in 1918. Nonetheless, its implications were substantial, particularly for the 
way in which minority German groups living beyond Germany’s new borders were 
constructed in official and non-official discourses in the period after 1919-20. 
 
Keywords: Auslandsdeutsche, citizenship, de-territorialisation, Germans abroad, 
re-territorialisation 
Studies on National Movements 5 (2020) | Articles 
| 2 Matthew Stibbe 
Introduction 
‘Coming home’ was a common experience for combatants and civilians 
from all belligerent nations at the end of the First World War. It was also 
a process fraught with conflicting emotions, political tensions and 
unresolved traumas, not least in those countries on the losing side.1 In 
Germany, the chairman of the newly-created Council of People’s 
Commissars and Reich President in waiting, Friedrich Ebert, famously 
welcomed back the ‘undefeated’ troops from the battlefields of the 
western front in a speech in Berlin on 10 December 1918.2 Various 
narratives connecting patriotic (male) sacrifice and national identity 
were constructed and communicated, leading to a ‘fragmented’ war 
memory and a failure to demobilise completely, at least in the cultural 
and political sense.3 As Benjamin Ziemann has shown, in the 1920s a 
plethora of republican as well as right-wing veterans groups competed 
with each other to define the war experience and give it meaning in an 
ever-changing, post-war, but hardly peace-like present.4 
In nationalist discourse and ritualised forms of protest, much was also 
heard in the 1920s and beyond about the Rückwanderer or ethnic 
German returnees from the East, and about the German-speaking 
minorities who remained in interwar Poland.5 These were the post-war 
successors to the tens of thousands of Russian Germans who had already 
begun ‘returning’ to the Reich from the 1880s onwards.6  However, 
instead of escaping late Tsarist Russification policies, they were now 
fleeing the violence of the Russian civil war and the repressiveness of the 
Bolshevik and White regimes. The ethnic German refugees from the East 
were subject to intensive reintegration efforts, while the Germans who 
stayed put in Poland or in other successor states of the Habsburg 
monarchy after 1919-20 not only had strong support from the Reich, but 
received certain formal legal protections under the post-war Minority 
Treaties, including ‘political, linguistic [and] religious rights’.7 So too, at 
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least in theory, did the colonial settlers (Kolonialdeutsche) in Germany’s 
largest pre-war colonial territory, German South West Africa, now 
administered by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate.8  While 
Germany lost all of its overseas colonies under the Treaty of Versailles, 
the continued presence of German colonial settlers in South West Africa, 
alongside efforts by the German Colonial Society and other pressure 
groups, allowed for the retention of an association between ‘whiteness’ 
and ‘Germanness’ into the 1920s and beyond.9 So too did the many myths 
and legends that were built up around the ‘heroic’ exploits of General 
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who commanded German forces in East Africa 
during the war, successfully evading much larger British, French, Belgian 
and Portuguese colonial armies and refusing to surrender until 25 
November 1918. When he and his troops finally returned to Berlin on 2 
March 1919, they were permitted a ‘victory parade’ through the 
Brandenburg Gate and were fêted by officials of the new republican 
government.10 
However, one group of ‘home-comers’ who have so far received little 
scholarly attention were the Auslandsdeutsche, the ‘Germans living 
abroad’ who were expelled from western Allied countries and non-
German colonial territories all over the world in the period 1919-20. This 
was a distinct but very diverse body of people, representing all those 
who had continued to hold German nationality and citizenship in spite of 
their, or their parents’ or grandparents’, emigration to foreign countries. 
Their legal status, which offered them certain consular protections 
before 1914, also ensured that they automatically became ‘enemy aliens’ 
once their ‘host’ countries had entered into formal hostilities with the 
Central Powers. During and immediately after the First World War, most 
of these overseas ex-patriate communities faced a mixture of 
internment, expropriation, commercial boycotts and, finally, forced 
migration. In 1919-20, many of the tens of thousands of Germans still 
living, or held captive in, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal or Allied 
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territories outside Europe had little choice but to ‘come home’, even if 
some of them had been born abroad and had never seen the 
‘fatherland’.11 The war had destroyed their lives and businesses and left 
them facing profoundly uncertain futures. In spite of this, they were not 
recognised, either in international or German domestic law, as a minority 
with specific claims or interests, or even as a disadvantaged group in 
need of long-term state support (or tax concessions). Unlike the ethnic 
Germans of Russian nationality, or the Kolonialdeutsche, they were soon 
forgotten, with successive Weimar governments showing little interest 
in their fate. 
This article will treat the Auslandsdeutsche not as one homogenous 
group, but as a heterogeneous body of people in early Weimar Germany 
who were collectively labelled as a special interest group by various 
support organisations that had been set up to help them, even if they 
were not treated as such by German officialdom. As far as the Reich and 
the individual German states were concerned, such persons were 
German citizens in a legal sense. Indeed, the Reich citizenship law of 
1913, a revision of the 1870 law, contained clauses designed to enable 
them to retain their legal ties and civic obligations to Germany, even if 
they had taken on a second nationality, that of their new ‘host’ country.12  
However, they were not regarded as ‘war victims’. If anything, they were 
branded as outsiders whose life stories and experiences might disrupt 
conventional republican and anti-republican narratives of the war. This 
official attitude was met at first with incomprehension and then with 
outrage on the part of the Auslandsdeutsche whose expectations of 
‘home-coming’ were markedly different to the actual reception that they 
received. As they were forced to recognise, the end of the war had 
brought with it not only a redrawing of borders in Europe and the loss of 
formal German colonies overseas, but a ‘larger global shift’ in Germany’s 
power position as the world in general pivoted awkwardly between a 
still colonial present and a post-colonial future.13 
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One way of conceptualising this phenomenon is to see it as a moment of 
re-territorialisation and de-transnationalisation of German national 
identity. The term ‘re-territorialisation’ is not understood here in the 
same way as the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
who seek to destabilise the very concept of ‘territoriality’ by deploying 
the dialectical argument that an ‘organism that is deterritorialized in 
relation to the exterior necessarily reterritorializes on its internal 
milieus.’14 Rather, it is used to denote a more contingent, open-ended 
process whereby the pre-1914 tendency in Imperial Germany to give 
‘greater weight to descent at the expense of territory as a constitutive 
principle of citizenship’ (Rogers Brubaker) was put into sudden, 
unexpected reverse.15 Indeed, in a significant revision of Brubaker’s 
thesis, I will argue that the original intentions behind the 1913 Reich 
citizenship law were very quickly overtaken by events. From 1914, the 
existence, status and future expectations of the Auslandsdeutsche were 
shaped not by ideas of ‘common descent’ but by the new national and 
imperial borders in and beyond Europe, and by the reconceptualisation 
of ethnic and cultural ‘difference’ which accompanied the global 
upheaval of war. Those returning from overseas in 1919 via Rotterdam, 
Hamburg, Switzerland or Alsace were often detained, for varying lengths 
of time, in special reception camps or Heimkehrlager.16 Especially if they 
had spent long periods of time abroad, their loyalty to the Reich, their 
attachment to Germany as a (now ‘dismembered’) territorial entity, and 
their ability to (re-) integrate were subject to doubt. Various advocate 
groups, based in Düsseldorf and Berlin, sought to help them find 
employment, to secure compensation from public funds for loss of 
confiscated property overseas, and/or to prepare them for re-emigration 
as and when new post-war opportunities might arise. However, such 
hopes were dashed by the peace settlement and its global as well as 
domestic economic consequences. By the end of 1919 relations between 
the Auslandsdeutsche and the new German state had become very poor, 
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with the former blaming the latter for failing to address their needs as an 
uprooted minority requiring special help and protection. 
In what follows, we will first look at the position of the Auslandsdeutsche 
in the German Empire before 1914, and their treatment at the hands of 
the enemy during the First World War. This will be followed by an 
overview of the expulsion measures enacted in Allied countries in 1919-
20, and the policies developed by the German authorities at Reich and 
state level to accommodate the ‘home-comers’ (Heimkehrer) while 
denying them any privileged position vis-à-vis domestic war victims and 
returning veterans from the war in Europe. A third section will examine 
the response of advocate groups and the gradual breakdown of relations 
with German officialdom. Finally, the conclusion will offer some broader 
reflections on the link between (imagined) non-European spaces, the ‘re-
territorialisation’ of nationalism and the political/cultural construction 
of ‘minorities’ in Europe in the immediate post-war years. 
The Auslandsdeutsche before 1914 and their experiences 
during the First World War 
Outward migration from German-speaking Central and East-Central 
Europe was already a fact of life prior to the nineteenth century. 
Beginning with the dawn of the early modern period, or rather the first 
Age of Discovery from the late fifteenth century, David Blackbourn 
mentions the numerous, albeit often anonymous ‘German travellers, 
sojourners, merchants, missionaries, priests, scholars, mining engineers 
[and] settlers’ who ‘moved… within empires marked out by others – the 
Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch [and] British.’17 The example of the German 
farmers attracted by Catherine the Great to colonise the Volga region of 
Tsarist Russia in the mid-1760s also springs to mind,18 as does the case 
of the German trading houses that settled in many of the leading 
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European ports, such as London, Amsterdam, Bordeaux and Cádiz, from 
the seventeenth century onwards.19 However, it was only really in the 
decades after the Napoleonic wars, and more particularly from the 
1850s, that the notion of ‘Germans abroad’ (Auslandsdeutsche) as a 
distinct, transnational category of Germans began to take shape.20 A 
number of ‘pull’ factors aided this process, including cheaper travel 
made possible by improvements in maritime transport and the coming 
of the telegraph and the railways, as did various ‘push factors’, such as 
economic down-turns, famines and/or political unrest at home.21  
Between 1816 and 1914 some 5.5 million Germans left their homelands 
in Central Europe for the United States. Others put down roots all over 
the world, with sizeable German communities in Britain, Belgium and 
France and throughout the British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and 
former Spanish Empires. The peak periods for emigration came in the 
years 1846 to 1857 and again from 1864 to 1873, accounting for one 
million each. Between 1880 and 1893 a further 1.8 million Germans left 
the territory of the Kaiserreich for pastures new,22 but thereafter the 
emigration figures fell dramatically as the German economy grew 
stronger in the wake of rapid industrialisation. In fact, in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, and the first decade of the twentieth, there was 
a much bigger internal migration of Germans from the countryside to the 
cities, as well as immigration of foreign seasonal workers, particularly 
from (Russian) Poland, Italy, Habsburg Austria and the Netherlands.23 
Indeed, the number of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 
Germany increased from twenty-six in 1890 to thirty-three in 1900 and 
forty-eight by 1910, while the overall population rose from forty million 
in 1872 to fifty-six million in 1900 and sixty-seven million in 1913.24 
Before 1914, many cultural pessimists in Germany saw the new 
industrial cities as cesspools of crime and degeneracy, as incubators of 
the ‘poison of commerce and materialism’ and even as a foreign or ‘alien’ 
presence on German soil.25 Leading figures in the establishment and 
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among the imperial ruling class were also concerned about the 
continuing rise in support for the Social Democrats (SPD), combining this 
with a horror of strikes and a broader ‘fear of a recrudescence of the 
revolutionary events of the year 1848.’26 In marked contrast, as Stefan 
Manz has noted, the hundreds of thousands of Auslandsdeutsche living in 
Africa, Asia, North and South America, and Australasia were regarded in 
Berlin, positively if a little optimistically, as ‘outposts of “Germanness” 
abroad’. Between them they were held to enjoy a variety of ‘persisting 
bonds’ to the Kaiserreich – cultural, economic, religious – which ‘had to 
be preserved for their own and the fatherland’s benefits.’27 In other 
words – and contrary to the claims of Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger – 
‘political-territorial questions’ were not especially important as a driver 
of official interest in the question of the Auslandsdeutsche after 1880.28 
Instead, the perceived threat posed by ‘national indifference’ among 
some German overseas emigrants, and even worse, of socialist or 
anarchist predilections among others, generated growing calls for 
sustained, government-backed, transnational activism. In order for this 
activism to succeed, it was believed, it had to sell a particular version of 
patriotic, conservative, Protestant Deutschtum while also taking into 
account the diversity of emigrant experiences, and the varied degrees of 
integration with native cultures and host societies to be found in 
different parts of the world. This in turn implied a certain, albeit hardly 
uncontested, ‘de-territorialisation’ of German identity. ‘Germanness’ 
was no longer confined to a particular territory (or territories, if one 
includes German overseas colonies acquired in the 1880s and 1890s). 
Rather it was also constructed and maintained via extra-territorial, 
global networks of like-minded patriots mobilised in support of German 
Weltpolitik.29 
Communities of German migrants living overseas were thus styled, 
nationally and transnationally, as ‘cultural markers’ of the new German 
Empire and its aspirations to imperial greatness on a par with Britain 
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and the United States.30 This was certainly the aim of the General German 
School Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein), founded in 1881 
and renamed the Association for Germans Abroad (Verein für das 
Deutschtum im Ausland, VDA) in 1908.31 On the one hand, overseas 
Germans were now claimed for overtly racist and imperialist agendas, 
with ‘Germanness’ clearly associated with ‘whiteness’ and European 
‘civilising missions’ in the colonial context. Yet it also signified that such 
agendas would themselves have to become more diverse and worldly, 
and more open to understanding and engaging with global and 
transnational processes.32 As Bradley D. Naranch has shown, the concept 
of ‘overseas Germans’ first emerged in the 1850s and 1860s as a way of 
keeping the ‘liberal “spirit of 1848”’ alive, a spirit which combined hopes 
for German unity with respect for regional diversity and religious and 
political pluralism.33 Even as liberalism began to fade at home in the 
wake of Bismarck’s ‘unification from above’ from the 1870s onwards, big 
business saw patriotic ‘German emigrants… [as] potential consumers of 
Germany’s industrial products’, and argued for closer ties with them, 
both now and in an imagined future when Germany had become a more 
dominant player in world commerce and trade.34 
Far from being merely the passive product of ‘armchair metropolitan 
fantasy’ among nationalists at home, the more committed 
Auslandsdeutsche were also active participants in the construction of 
their own transnational diasporic communities in the years 1871 to 
1914 – whether as language teachers, Christian missionaries or 
members of navy leagues and other nationalist associations.35 Some of 
the most vociferous exponents of Deutschtum abroad were in fact 
naturalised citizens of the ‘host’ society, but this did not necessarily 
prevent them from trying to forge or maintain links with their home 
country, including the cultivation of proud memories of wartime (1864-
71) or peacetime (1871-1914) military service in the German army.36 
After the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Berlin made sustained 
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efforts to call patriotic Auslandsdeutsche back home to serve the 
fatherland in its current hour of need. Quite a few reservists did try to 
make the journey to Germany; some were captured by the British en 
route and interned, a cause of much controversy, especially when they 
were taken from neutral ships docked in British ports or intercepted on 
the high seas. But others completed the journey successfully and either 
joined the German armed forces fighting on the western or eastern fronts 
or enlisted in the Imperial Navy.37 
For information on the well-being of those left behind in enemy 
countries, the Imperial Government relied on the help of the Zentral-
Auskunftsstelle für Auswanderer, a body originally set up by the German 
Colonial Society around the turn of the century but in 1902 brought 
under the direct administrative and political control of the Reich 
Chancellery in Berlin and used to support Germans living in places 
beyond German colonies too.38 In response to an enquiry from the 
German Red Cross’s Central Information Bureau in early November 
1914, the Zentral-Auskunftsstelle set out what it understood to be its new 
role in wartime while making clear that it still reported directly to the 
office of the Reich Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg: 
…[our organisation] is responsible for making official enquiries 
about the fate of all Germans who are not serving in the army or 
navy but who are currently stranded in enemy countries, or who 
can reasonably be assumed to find themselves trapped there. This 
means Great Britain, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and Japan, 
as well as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and [other] British and French 
colonies. On the other hand, we cannot make official enquiries 
concerning Reich citizens in neutral countries.39 
As other countries joined the Allied side, beginning with Italy in 1915 
and Portugal in 1916, and ending with Siam, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti 
and Honduras in 1918, the Zentral-Auskunftsstelle expanded the 
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geographical reach of its activities.40 This came on top of the work done 
firstly by different branches of the German Red Cross, and through them, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, in respect of 
Germans (and their families) who were actually interned as civilian or 
military prisoners of war in enemy states;41 and secondly by a body set 
up by the Reich Office of Interior in September 1914 to monitor alleged 
abuses against German civilians, the Reichskommission zur Erörterung 
von Gewalttätigkeiten gegen deutsche Zivilpersonen in Feindesland (Reich 
Commission for the discussion of acts of violence committed against 
German civilians on enemy territory).42 
But in reality there was very little that the German government could do 
for Auslandsdeutsche after the autumn of 1914. This was partly a matter 
of the vagaries of geography. German nationals and ethnic Germans 
fleeing those areas of Eastern Europe over-run by Russian Tsarist troops 
could be supported by organisations such as the Beratungsstelle für 
Deutsche Flüchtlinge (Advice Bureau for German Refugees).43 However, 
with the imposition of the Allied naval blockade and the cutting of 
Germany’s transatlantic telegraph cables, much of the rest of the world 
was beyond Germany’s reach. With the exception of German East Africa, 
most German overseas colonies were occupied by enemy countries – 
Britain, France, Belgium and Japan – in 1914-15.44 From August 1914 
onwards, ever larger numbers of German men of military age were 
interned in metropolitan France and Britain, and in their extra-European 
territories and dominions. This was accompanied by expropriation and 
expulsion measures, as well as sporadic mob violence. Anti-German riots 
became a global phenomenon following the sinking of the Lusitania in 
May 1915, with attacks on German communities throughout the UK as 
well as in Moscow, Johannesburg, Durban, Sydney, Melbourne and 
elsewhere.45 Following the sinking of one of its ships by a German U-boat, 
there were even anti-German riots in Brazil in April 1917.46 Several other 
South American countries, including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Peru, 
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came under pressure to intern the crews of German merchant ships 
stuck in their ports.47 In the US after 1917, anti-foreigner violence was 
more typically of the vigilante kind, and was directed against individuals 
rather than whole communities, but went as far as the public lynching on 
5 April 1918 of one German immigrant from Dresden, Robert Prager, 
who was a coal miner working in Collinsville, Illinois, and was thought to 
hold socialist beliefs.48 
However, although the chief causes of the wartime persecution of 
German minorities are to be found on the home fronts of the Allied 
powers,49 the somewhat reserved response of the German government 
in Berlin cannot be explained merely by reference to unfavourable 
geopolitical factors and the changing fortunes of war. Rather, it also 
reflected a shift in mentality away from the transnational to the national 
when it came to visions of German war aims, and a corresponding ‘re-
territorialisation’ of notions of ‘Germanness’ and ‘state interest’. For 
instance, Reich Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s famous 9 September 
1914 war aims memorandum, which was brought to light in the early 
1960s by the Hamburg historian Fritz Fischer, envisaged an immediate 
territorial settlement in which France would be ‘so weakened as to make 
her revival as a great power impossible for all time’ and Russia ‘thrust 
back as far as possible from Germany’s frontier.’ Bethmann mentioned 
‘the creation of a continuous [German-ruled] Central African colonial 
empire’, but this was of secondary importance and anyway was to be 
‘considered later’, as were the more specific territorial aims ‘to be 
realised vis-à-vis Russia.’50 
Scholars have interpreted Bethmann Hollweg’s September war aims 
programme differently, with Fischer arguing that it represented a clear-
cut intention to ‘permanently change the face of Europe’ as a step 
towards the attainment of world power,51 and critics, such as Egmont 
Zechlin, casting it merely as a temporary, tactical plan to enable Germany 
to continue to hold its own against Britain and the British Empire, in the 
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expectation that France and possibly also Russia would soon concede 
defeat and sue for a separate peace.52 For our purposes, however, the 
interesting thing to note is the wording used in the preamble to the 
programme. Here Bethmann boldly stated what he thought the ‘general 
aim of the war’ was, namely to achieve ‘security for the German Reich in 
west and east for all imaginable time.’53 As the finer details of the 
programme then go on to suggest, economic and military ‘security’ were 
conceived solely in territorial terms. There was no mention in this 
document of Auslandsdeutsche in the sense of extra-territorial networks 
of German emigrants or how they might contribute to securing the 
preservation of the Kaiserreich after the war, whether in the immediate 
future or ‘for all imaginable time’. In other words, the Auslandsdeutsche 
were no longer being thought of, as they had been in certain circles 
before 1914, as crucial to Germany’s position as a world power. 
This ‘re-territorialisation’ of the political imaginary in Germany, in other 
words of the Kaiserreich’s global power relations and conceptions of its 
own ‘state interest’, was most visible at the level of ‘grand strategy’ 
(Große Politik). However, it can also be seen at other, more banal levels 
of German wartime administration. When it came to the approval or 
rejection of wartime applications for naturalisation, for instance, the 
Reich pursued a line which differed from virtually all other belligerent 
states. Whereas the latter were keen to reduce the number of 
naturalisations permitted, and even to reverse some that had been 
granted to persons of enemy heritage before 1914, German wartime 
policy at Reich and state level was to loosen restrictions, including in 
respect to resident aliens of Russian, British and non-Christian 
backgrounds. As Eli Nathans notes: 
The result, in Prussia, was an increase of some three thousand 
naturalizations each year over the 1914 figure, at least in 1915 and 
1916. This benevolence even extended to foreign Jews. Several 
hundred of the petitions granted in 1915 were from Jewish men 
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enlisting in the army, a figure for Jewish naturalizations far higher 
than those recorded before the war. The strictures on the 
naturalization of Social Democrats were also relaxed. The Social 
Democrats had voted for war credits, after all.54   
Compared to the pre-war trend, then, this marked a somewhat abrupt 
shift back towards territorial residency (Ansässigkeit) and economic 
performance (Leistung), as opposed to ‘Germanness’ in a cultural, 
religious or transnational sense, as a key criteria for acquiring or 
retaining German citizenship. The cause was largely the manpower 
shortages on the German home front, but this too was linked to issues of 
‘security’, whether defined in military or economic terms or both.  
Meanwhile, when it came to maintaining enthusiasm for the war, 
emphasis switched to the hundreds and thousands of young German 
men whose remains lay in the fields of Flanders and northern France, or 
in the hostile landscapes of the East, and who would never come home 
again. The best of the country’s youth was said to have died in the war in 
Europe; it was their masculine heroism and self-sacrifice that would 
‘inspire a new and stronger Germany.’55 True, propagandists writing for 
the Imperial government’s War Press Office (Kriegspresseamt) continued 
to emphasise the ‘necessity’ of extra-European colonies, but this too was 
now couched in territorial and racial terms only. (White) German blood 
had been spilled in defence of these colonies, while Britain, France, 
Belgium and Portugal had all deliberately reneged on pre-war 
agreements to maintain established racial hierarchies in Africa in the 
event of war in Europe. It was on these grounds, rather than as a 
contribution to expanding global networks, that demands for an 
enlarged German empire in the centre of that continent (Mittelafrika) 
were now legitimised.56 
The reserve side of this was that persons of German nationality abroad 
were looked on with increasing suspicion, especially those who had not 
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tried to return ‘home’ in 1914 to support the fatherland. In particular, 
the small number of German nationals who were repatriated to the Reich 
from enemy countries under exchange agreements reached during the 
war - mainly women, children and older men, as well as internees who 
were released from captivity on medical grounds - were met with a 
lukewarm, and at times even downright hostile, attitude from German 
officialdom. Certainly their loyalty and patriotism were not taken for 
granted. The acting commander of the Seventh Army Corps, 
headquartered in Münster and responsible for military security in some 
of the most strategically significant areas of western Germany, including 
part of the border with the neutral Netherlands, was particularly 
concerned. On 30 July 1918 he wrote to the provincial governors in 
Prussian Westphalia and to representatives of the state governments in 
the principalities of Lippe and Schaumburg-Lippe to highlight his fears: 
The dangers to state security posed by [German] civilian persons 
returning home from countries overseas are fundamentally the 
same as the threat posed by returning members of the armed 
forces: political subversion, spying or carrying out acts of sabotage 
on behalf of enemy powers, infiltration of undesirable elements, 
and so on.57 
Similar views were held by German diplomats serving overseas. On 19 
March 1918, for example, the German consul-general in The Hague, 
Friedrich Rosen, wrote to the Prussian War Ministry to notify officials 
there that the 600 German civilian internees so far released from Britain 
and sent to Holland under the July 1917 exchange agreement were not 
ideal candidates for repatriation as they were suffering from ‘all the 
heinous effects of long-term captivity’, including ‘complete nervous 
exhaustion and barbed-wire disease.’58 On 26 April he followed this up 
with a letter to the German Chancellor Georg von Hertling, in which he 
warned that 
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there are many inferior elements [minderwertige Elemente] among 
the German civilian prisoners currently interned in the 
Netherlands… The great majority of them… were resident in 
England before the war; many of these have become very 
anglicised and, in spite of their obligation to register for military 
service [in Germany], have never given a thought to serving the 
Fatherland in uniform. Only a handful of them belong to that group 
of Germans who were seized on board neutral ships while trying 
to reach home from distant lands at the start of the war… in order 
to serve the Fatherland in its hour of danger.59    
Rosen’s concerns demonstrate that, despite all the propaganda accusing 
the Allies of abuses against German civilians, official suspicion of 
Auslandsdeutsche had already begun during the war itself. 
Disappointment at the US entry into the war as an associate power of the 
Allies in April 1917, and the evident failure of German Americans to do 
more to undermine or sabotage American mobilisation measures 
thereafter, may have contributed to this.60 However, it was in the war’s 
immediate aftermath that these concerns grew to impact more directly 
on policy at Reich and state level, as we shall now see. 
The Expulsion of the Auslandsdeutsche in 1919-20 and 
their reception in post-war Germany 
Some ‘overseas Germans’ had already been expelled from enemy 
countries during the war or had been exchanged as a result of bilateral 
agreements mediated by neutral countries. However, much larger 
numbers found themselves forcibly repatriated to Germany in the years 
1919-20. For reasons of space we will leave to one side the hundreds of 
thousands of Russian-subject Germans who fled from the former Tsarist 
Empire as a result of the Bolshevik revolution, the civil war of 1918-20 
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and the famine of 1921-2. We will also exclude from consideration the 
470,000 or so residents of Weimar Germany who (according to the 1925 
census) had lived in Posen and Pomerelia before the war but had 
‘voluntarily’ quit their homelands as a result of the border changes in 
1919 which had left them living under Polish rule.61 These groups in 
many ways shared a similar fate to the Auslandsdeutsche, including being 
seen in a poor light by officialdom and being temporarily housed in 
Heimkehrlager. However, in the political language of the time, and in 
order not to confuse them with their post-Second World War 
counterparts, the German Heimatvertriebene of 1944-47, they are better 
described as Rückwanderer (‘returnees’), deutschstämmige Zuwanderer 
(’immigrants of German descent’) or Flüchtlinge (‘refugees’) rather than 
as Auslandsdeutsche.62   
The term Auslandsdeutsche in the context of the immediate post-First 
World War era referred more narrowly to those ‘overseas Germans’ who 
were forcibly removed from the following countries in the years 1919-
20: Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal, together with their overseas 
colonies and dominions; the United States and its overseas colonies; 
Brazil and various Central American countries which broke off 
diplomatic relations with Germany in the years 1917-18; and China. Also 
included here are the more than 200,000 German victims of the French 
épuration (‘purification’) measures in Alsace-Lorraine in 1918-20.63 
Siam had already expelled its 274-strong German community to British 
India in February 1918, while 450 Germans from Palestine were 
removed to British Egypt in late 1917.64 Earlier in the war, German 
civilians had been evacuated from West Africa in 1914/15 and from East 
Africa in 1916, the former finally arriving in metropolitan France (via 
French North Africa) or ending up in neutral Spanish internment in 
1916; and the latter being sent to various destinations (India, Egypt, 
South Africa, the Azores and metropolitan Portugal).65     
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In Britain, Belgium, France and Portugal, as well as in most of their 
overseas possessions, the default assumption, at least from the 
beginning of 1918, was that all Germans would be expelled as soon as 
possible, except those individuals granted exemptions. Britain and South 
Africa eventually awarded a relatively large number of certificates 
granting leave to remain, especially to Germans of long-term residency 
or to British-born women who had acquired German nationality through 
marriage. On the other hand, France, Belgium and Portugal allowed very 
few exemptions, as did Australia, New Zealand, India and China.66 
Countries in the New World, including the United States and Brazil, as 
well as the British Dominion of Canada, adopted the reverse position, 
assuming by and large that most immigrants of German descent would 
not be expelled, except for individuals identified as ‘undesirable’ or a 
threat to national security. In the context of the post-war ‘Red Scare’, this 
typically meant those ‘overseas Germans’ and other aliens identified as 
having left-wing views or suspected of being strike leaders.67    
Expellees from France usually entered Germany via Switzerland or 
directly across the new border from Alsace-Lorraine. The remainder 
came back home on Allied, usually British ships, sometimes via stop-off 
points including Singapore, Bombay, Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar and the Isle 
of Man. Already on 10 January 1919 the Home Office in London assured 
the Secretary of the Prisoners of War Department, Lord Newton, that 
‘civilian enemy subjects’ would be repatriated from all parts of the 
Empire ‘as rapidly as shipping can be obtained.’68 Given the ongoing 
Allied naval blockade of Germany, Rotterdam in the Netherlands was still 
used as a principal port of entry for those coming from overseas, at least 
in the initial period after the war.69 More than 11,807 Germans arrived 
here from outside Europe between 7 April and 1 August 1919 alone, 
3,014 of them without papers.70 Rotterdam was seemingly only replaced 
by Hamburg in early 1920, after the lifting of the blockade. 71  
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The reception that the expellees received upon crossing the border into 
Germany in 1919 or 1920 was often cold and bureaucratic. Certainly it 
was very different to the ‘heroes’ welcome’ offered by Ebert to the 
returning troops in Berlin in December 1918. Regarding those 
Auslandsdeutsche who were coming ‘home’ after living abroad for many 
years, the main concern of the authorities was where they would live and 
who would house them. Already in April 1918, with the Treaty of Brest 
Litovsk with Russia and the Treaty of Bucharest with Romania about to 
be signed, the civil authorities in Prussia had agreed to take over 
responsibility for the care of ‘returnees’ from the East from the German 
Red Cross, provided that the persons concerned were ‘Reich Germans 
with a claim to Prussian or, in some cases, non-Prussian citizenship who 
have fled or been expelled from enemy countries.’72 It was further agreed 
‘that over time every province [of Prussia] will take the same per capita 
allocation of destitute refugees relative to the size of its overall 
population.’73 As the war in the west came to an end later that year, 
further plans had to be made. In October 1918, for instance, the civilian 
authorities in Düsseldorf were pressed upon by the German military to 
receive 150 members of the pro-German Flemish separatist movement 
and their families (350 people in total) who were being evacuated from 
occupied Belgium for their own safety and were – according to 
instructions issued by the acting commander of the Seventh Army Corps 
– to be treated as ‘political refugees’.74 Two hundred German families 
were likewise evacuated from Belgium via the border post at Liège on 1 
November 1918 and were again sent to an emergency reception centre 
(Übernahmestelle) in Düsseldorf.75 
On 3 January 1919 a new government body, the Reichszentralstelle für 
Kriegs- und Zivilgefangene, met for the first time in Berlin, but it was 
powerless to prevent post-war expulsions of Germans and in reality 
spent most of its energy defending the war record of the German Foreign 
Office and Reich Colonial Office when it came to looking after German 
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civilian interests overseas.76 The question of military prisoners of war 
was easier to manage politically in the sense that they largely wanted to 
come home once the war was over, and the Allies could be condemned 
for continuing to hold them after the end of hostilities while 
hypocritically claiming to have fought the Central Powers in order to 
‘strengthen and rebuild international law.’77 Civilian prisoners, however, 
had diverse interests and a more complicated legal status, which meant 
that repatriation was often involuntary and combined with loss of 
property, family separation and destitution. In Britain, for instance, the 
number of residents of German heritage fell from 57,500 in 1914 to 
22,254 in 1919, largely as a result of internment, denaturalisations, 
‘voluntary’ repatriation and expulsions, the latter mostly carried out 
between January and April 1919.78 From April 1919 it was the turn of 
German expellees from overseas British colonies and dominions, and 
from countries allied to Britain such as Portugal, Brazil and China. Most 
experienced long and arduous journeys, accompanied by violence and 
abuse, on their way back to western Germany via Rotterdam. For 
instance, Germans expelled from China in March 1919 on board three 
British ships complained about the ‘heavy-handed and humiliating 
treatment… that was meted out to them by the British authorities at the 
time of embarkation in Shanghai and during the journey’, even though 
women, children and older men had been among the passengers: 
The steamers were completely over-filled and utterly unsuitable 
for carrying a large number of Europeans on a week-long voyage 
through tropical climates. The behaviour of the British authorities 
in Singapore, where the ships were moored for a further week in 
the glaring sun while goods were loaded, was grossly inhumane. 
Even the severely sick were refused permission to go on land in 
search of healthier accommodation. There were a number of 
deaths in consequence.79 
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The more than 1,000 Germans forced to leave South Africa in May 1919 
included a group who departed on the H.M.T. Imgona from Durban in 
Natal province. When they arrived in Rotterdam it became apparent that 
some of their luggage had not been loaded because ‘insufficient space 
had been left in the holds’ for it.80 Expulsions also took place from Egypt, 
Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus, East Africa and various British Caribbean and 
Atlantic Islands (Barbados, Trinidad and Bermuda) after April 1919.81 
These measures were given retrospective sanction by the Treaty of 
Versailles, signed on 28 June. Under article 220, Germany was obliged to 
‘admit to its territory without distinction all persons liable to 
repatriation’, a move designed by the Allies to avoid a situation in which 
they might be forced to take back expellees who were refused entry on 
arrival ‘home’.82 
From early 1919 the German press had reported on the supposed 
‘unworthy treatment’ of German expellees at the hands of British 
soldiers during the sea-crossing from England to the Netherlands.83 
Women’s groups were set up to demand a more proactive stance from 
the German government in respect to repatriation of German prisoners 
abroad, and a mass protest was staged in Berlin in April.84 Meanwhile, on 
orders of the Reich Ministry of Interior, special camps or Heimkehrlager 
were set up to house the incoming returnees, often in former holding 
centres for POWs such as the one near Regensburg in Bavaria, which was 
handed over to the Bavarian Ministry of Interior in 1919.85 Other big 
camps were established at Essen in the Ruhr and Münster in Westphalia, 
coming under the control of the Prussian provincial authorities. In 
Austria too, civilian Heimkehrlager were established at the behest of the 
Ministry of Interior in Vienna.86 In 1919-20 the typical stay in one of the 
camps for Auslandsdeutsche entering Germany from the west was 
between one and two months – an admittedly much shorter time than 
the average six months for those ethnic German ‘returnees’ coming from 
the East.87  Most of the Heimkehrlager in western Germany had indeed 
Studies on National Movements 5 (2020) | Articles 
| 22 Matthew Stibbe 
been shut down by the end of 1920, while the ones in the East lasted at 
least until 1923, and some until 1925. Jochen Oltmer argues that, from 
the authorities’ point of view, the Heimkehrlager had a largely integrative 
function, being concerned with assisting returning Auslandsdeutsche 
with finding accommodation and jobs. But apart from the miners and 
former Imperial officials from Alsace-Lorraine, there was no special 
treatment for them, or protected status when it came to tax breaks or the 
allocation of employment opportunities.88    
In the meantime, for Auslandsdeutsche coming from further afield  than 
Alsace-Lorraine, the camps made a clear statement about citizenship and 
loyalty, namely that those who had lived abroad and had therefore been 
absent from German soil for some time would not have their status as 
members of the putative Kriegsgemeinschaft taken for granted, 
irrespective of their German heritage. Furthermore, their past 
instrumentalisation as transnational supporters of German 
Flottenpolitik and Weltpolitik could not override the feeling that in 
national terms, they now symbolised the shame of Germany’s defeat and 
its helplessness in face of Allied demands. Reich Germans migrating 
from, or choosing to stay in, Poland could be cast in national and 
international terms as an ‘embattled minority’; it was in the interests of 
successive Weimar governments to draw attention to their plight, both 
domestically and for foreign policy reasons.89 However, the ‘new political 
and territorial realities’ established at Versailles in June 1919 meant that 
the Auslandsdeutsche coming from western Europe and the wider world 
could not fulfil the same symbolic function. Rather, to cite Marcia Klotz, 
both the loss of German colonies in 1919 and the return of the non-
European Auslandsdeutsche served as a ‘reminder of the new global 
order and Germany’s diminutive status within it.’90 In this sense, the 
establishment of Heimkehrlager in western Germany in 1919-20 was not 
just about economic reintegration or housing, but came to symbolise a 
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broader ‘de-transnationalisation of [German] national identity’ which 
prefigured that of the post-1945 era.91 
Support groups for Auslandsdeutsche 
This recasting of national identity to downgrade or remove entirely the 
importance of transnational forms of Deutschtum or Germanness was of 
course not without its domestic critics. Already in August 1918 the 
chairman of the Reichsstelle für deutsche Rückwanderung und 
Auswanderung (Reich Bureau for German Remigration and Emigration), 
a new pressure group based in Berlin-Charlottenburg, began writing to 
various state representatives in order to pass on concerns that had been 
relayed to him by the VDA and other groups about the supposed 
mistreatment of Auslandsdeutsche returning from western Allied 
countries. The gist of the complaints was  
that the returnees have not been received in friendly fashion, 
especially by lower level police and government officials, and that 
their feelings of attachment to the homeland, which had come to 
life again at the beginning of the war, have been negatively 
impacted [by this]. The returnees have been viewed in a number 
of quarters as an unwelcome burden on local welfare resources. A 
recurrent story is that officials have the same negative attitude 
towards the returnees as they do towards emigrants in general, 
treating both groups as ‘undesirable’ members of the population.92  
Such treatment, the letter continued, endangered ‘important 
demographic, economic and military goals.’ More particularly, it was a 
duty of the state ‘to promote and strengthen patriotic attitudes and ties 
of belonging to the motherland among the Auslandsdeutsche, because 
they alone constitute the right human material needed to rebuild the 
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[extra-territorial] links destroyed during the war.’93 Whether this letter 
did any good seems unlikely. Indeed, on 26 October, as the war was 
coming to an end, the Prussian War Ministry wrote to all state 
governments reiterating its earlier warnings that the return of ‘suspect 
elements’ among the Auslandsdeutsche might ‘offer new opportunities to 
our enemies… [to promote] espionage, sabotage or subversive 
propaganda.’ Border and welfare officials, it continued, should be 
particularly on the lookout for ‘fraudulent persons who have infiltrated 
returnee groups, and persons who are genuine returnees but have been 
recruited by our enemies for hostile purposes.’94 
Things would only get worse after the 11 November armistice, especially 
as it became ever clearer that a large proportion of the Auslandsdeutsche 
living in western Allied countries and colonies would now be expelled. 
By spring 1919 – i.e. before the terms of the peace settlement were 
known – a number of support groups had been set up to draw attention 
to the plight of the Auslandsdeutsche and to support their attempts to re-
establish themselves at home or abroad. Among them was the Hilfsbund 
für Auslandsdeutsche, founded in Düsseldorf in May 1919 as a joint 
venture by the local branches of the Auslandsbund Deutscher Frauen, the 
Baltischer Vertrauensrat, the Frauenbund der deutschen Kolonial-
Gesellschaft, the Ostmarkverein, the Verein für das Deutschtum im 
Ausland, the Vereinigung deutscher Flüchtlinge aus Belgien and the 
Westdeutsche Vereinigung ehemaliger Zivilinternierter.95 There was also 
a separate Schutzbund der im Feindesland durch Kriegshandlung 
geschädigten Zivilpersonen, which represented expellees from former 
enemy countries looking for new employment opportunities in 
commerce and the tourist trade. In a round robin letter sent to several 
leading Düsseldorf firms in July 1919, the Schutzbund declared:  
Among our members are salesmen, exporters and importers, 
engineers, chemists, technicians of various kinds, mechanics, 
craftsmen and hotel workers. Most of them have several years’ 
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experience of working abroad, making them well-travelled and 
highly skilled in business and languages.96 
Meanwhile, another body claiming to represent the interests of 
Auslandsdeutsche at national level was the Volksbund zum Schutze der 
deutschen Kriegs- und Zivilgefangenen, founded in Berlin on 20 December 
1918 and initially calling itself the Reichsbund before changing its name 
to the more populist-sounding Volksbund in early 1919.97 From the 
middle of 1919 this organisation campaigned for proper compensation 
for Germans who had lost property or businesses when they were 
expelled from enemy countries. However, at a meeting with 
representatives of the Reich Ministry for Economics and various German 
companies on 13 August 1919, it became obvious to Volksbund 
representatives that the Auslandsdeutsche, even if they were to receive a 
settlement, would be heavily disadvantaged by the wartime and post-
war inflation. Re-establishing businesses overseas would be made all the 
more difficult if what little compensation they received was paid in 
devalued Reich marks rather than foreign currency, and if they were also 
expected to pay high rates of taxation. But the Reich Ministry and the 
leading industrialists would not budge on this issue, insisting that it 
would be wrong to privilege Auslandsdeutsche over Inlandsdeutsche 
when it came to compensation decisions. For the Volksbund, this failure 
to recognise the particular economic needs of the Auslandsdeutsche was 
grossly unfair. Domestic German industries that had lost property 
abroad during the war had still been able to keep their domestic 
operations going after 1914, and in some cases, had made handsome 
profits via government contracts. Some still had foreign currency 
reserves dating back to before the war. 
On the other hand, the Auslandsdeutsche have suffered enormous 
losses as a result of the liquidation of their property held abroad; 
in many cases they have lost their entire [means of] existence.98 
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When the Federal Council (Reichsrat), representing the individual 
German states, endorsed the Reich government’s decision in this regard 
on 27 November 1920, this caused further outrage. A joint letter from 
the local branches of the Bund der Auslandsdeutschen in the unoccupied 
part of the Rhineland and the province of Westphalia to the head of the 
Rhineland regional administration in Düsseldorf estimated that its 
members would get at best one fifth of the true value of their liquidated 
property back, and called this a ‘betrayal’ by the fatherland: 
The pioneers of Deutschtum abroad, who once built German 
associations, schools and churches throughout the world, who 
fostered German art and life and who provided a market for 
German products across the entire Earth, have today been reduced 
by the German government to Reich citizens of the fourth class.99 
‘We are no less German than the Inlandsdeutsche and the over-privileged 
Alsace-Lorrainers’, the letter continued, a reference to the notion that 
expellees from the former Reichsland on Germany’s western border with 
France had been given preferential treatment when it came to allocation 
of jobs, especially those who had been civil servants in the post-1871 
Imperial bureaucracy. ‘We demand from the government equal 
treatment as citizens with equal rights.’100 
How many of the Auslandsdeutsche were able to re-establish themselves 
in the new republican Germany, with only minimum compensation and 
limited job opportunities, and how many decided to re-emigrate, if they 
could, is difficult to establish with any confidence, but seeking answers 
to these questions would certainly make a worthwhile future research 
project. One starting point would be the first postwar census in the UK, 
undertaken on 19 June 1921 and due to be published online by the family 
history website Findmypast, in association with the UK Office for 
National Statistics, in January 2022.101 Cross-referencing this with the 
1911 census, and with lists of German civilians released from British 
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internment camps and expelled to Germany in 1919, would reveal how 
many had been able to slip back into Britain from the beginning of 1920 
onwards. Although trying to guess in advance what the census records 
for 1921 will reveal is a potentially hazardous enterprise, it seems likely 
that quite a few Auslandsdeutsche would have sought to depart from 
Germany again as soon as possible, in particular those who had left 
behind families when they were expelled from their host countries. 
Conclusion 
By the time the Reichsrat made its decision in November 1920 to back 
the Reich government’s policy of making no special concessions to the 
Auslandsdeutsche, the state governments’ attention had already shifted 
to the much larger group of deutschstämmige Zuwanderer (migrants of 
ethnic German background) coming from the East. This group was 
officially assisted not only by the Reichszentrale für Kriegs- und 
Zivilgefangene, whose director, the Social Democrat Daniel Stücklen, was 
appointed Reichskommissar für Zivilgefangene und Flüchtlinge on 30 
August 1920, but also by the German Red Cross. Most of these ethnic 
German migrants from the East were non-propertied farm labourers and 
forestry workers who came either on their own steam, or later on, 
through the assistance of philanthropic groups.102 Like their 
counterparts who ‘returned’ to Germany to escape Tsarist Russification 
measures between the 1880s and 1914, they were typically illiterate and 
lacked knowledge of (Reich) German culture and law.103 The number of 
camps established in Germany’s eastern borderlands to cater for these 
migrants was increased from six to nine by the end of 1920, and reached 
a total of twenty-two, with a maximum population of 36,899, by the end 
of 1922. Between autumn 1920 and April 1923, according to Stücklen, 
around 200,000 Deutschstämmige passed through these camps; 
thereafter the numbers tailed off, with the last camp dissolved in May 
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1925.104 In the first years after the war, the Prussian and other state 
governments preferred to hold German migrants from Poland in camps 
for relatively long periods, not only because it was difficult to find jobs 
and accommodation for them, but because they could then be 
instrumentalised as ‘powerful symbols of German suffering’ or – on the 
nationalist, anti-Versailles right – as the basis for revisionist claims to 
lost territories in the East.105 Other German-speakers were encouraged 
to stay in Poland for the same reasons.106 The advocates of territorial 
revision in the East in the early 1920s usually did not go as far as the 
geographers and historians of the period 1925-35 who, through their 
supposedly ‘scientific’ Ostforschung, laid ‘claim to areas of German 
settlement that had never been part of any German state in Eastern 
Europe.’ But they were nonetheless a stepping-stone towards the 
radicalised völkisch-racist forms of national identity established under 
the Nazis.107 
Where does this leave the Auslandsdeutsche, whose existence largely 
disappeared from public view after 1920? They were certainly not 
constructed as a minority in the same way as the Germans from Poland 
were. This was not just for reasons of formal foreign policy, but, as I have 
argued in this article, also reflected a more general cultural shift towards 
the re-territorialisation of notions of Germanness. The ‘burning’ or 
‘bleeding borders’ in the East were something tangible; they provided an 
emotional identification with the nation and its suffering, or, as Elizabeth 
Harvey puts it, they were plainly well-suited to provide the ‘imagery of a 
national body, violated and mutilated.’108 The same applied, albeit to a 
lesser extent, to the confiscated German colonial territories in Africa and 
the Pacific.109 But the emotional response to the loss of extra-territorial 
networks and transnational relationships represented by the 
Auslandsdeutsche – whether of the religious, associational, linguistic or 
commercial kind – was far more muted, reflecting Weimar Germany’s 
uncomfortable and ambiguous position as a ‘postcolonial nation in a still-
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colonial world.’110  Certainly the sense of injustice felt by or on behalf of 
the Auslandsdeutsche could not sustain anything like the level of 
nationalist/quasi-religious ‘fervour’ and ‘cultural remobilization for 
other wars’ that territorial issues like the ‘Polish question’ in the 1920s 
and 30s could.111 Newly-established pan-German networks after 1918, 
as well as older bodies seeking to revive their political fortunes in the 
post-war era, chose as their ‘sites of memory’ places closer to home, such 
as Danzig, Upper Silesia, the Sudetenland, Saxon Transylvania, South 
Tyrol or Vojvodina. Although they sometimes used phrases like Grenz- 
und Auslandsdeutsche, the intention was rarely to draw attention to 
Germans once living, or continuing to live, in such faraway places as 
Britain, France, Portugal, India, China, South Africa, Australasia or the 
Americas.112 Rather, the latter were now, more often than not, cast as that 
part of the Volk living ‘on foreign soil’.113 For Hitler, foreign soil was 
something that had to be conquered, regardless of who lived there: in the 
world, as he saw it, races had to colonise or be colonised. There was no 
mid-way position based on informal spheres of influence or global, extra-
territorial networks creating an interconnected but diverse and ‘liberal’ 
German world as an outward expression of the ‘ideas of 1848’.114    
This finding also has broader implications for the way we look at the 
question of national movements and border populations in post-First 
World War Europe. In particular, it is an illustration of how significant 
historical entanglements with, and ways of (re-) imagining, non-
European spaces could be in shaping the fate of European minorities.115 
Eric Hobsbawm has characterised the years 1918-50 as the ‘apogee of 
nationalism’, with spaces for national heterogeneity and diversity – 
although perhaps not for international activism – correspondingly 
rendered precarious and suspect.116 Much of this was connected with a 
re-territorialisation of nation-states which had already begun in 1914, or 
perhaps even during the Balkan wars of 1912-13. From this point of 
view, the Auslandsdeutsche belonged to a different age, one in which the 
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borders of national belonging had been more open, both geographically 
and in terms of a willingness to include far-flung transnational 
communities of citizens within economic and cultural ways of imagining 
nationhood. With the reframing of ideas about diversity through the 
Minority Treaties of the early 1920s, and with Germany, as a wounded, 
‘postcolonial nation’, powerless to influence events accept through 
actions – which it did not always fully control – on its own territory,117 
the Auslandsdeutsche had quite simply become an anachronism. 
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